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Hostile Media Perceptions of 
Friendly Media Do Reinforce 
Partisanship
Jan Kleinnijenhuis1 , Tilo Hartmann1, Martin Tanis1, 
and Anita M. J. van Hoof1
Abstract
The hostile media effect (HME) entails that partisanship incites hostile perceptions of 
media content. However, other research underscores that partisans selectively turn 
to like-minded media, resulting in a friendly media phenomenon (FMP). The present 
study suggests that the HME and FMP co-exist, and, furthermore, jointly affect 
people’s voting behavior. More specifically, based on a media content analysis and a 
long-term panel survey surrounding the 2014 election for the European Parliament 
in the Netherlands, we find that people selectively turn to like-minded friendly media 
(FMP), but perceive coverage about the EU (European Union) in these media as 
relatively unsupportive of their own position (HME). In this context, the FMP and 
HME appear to jointly influence voting behavior. People cast votes in line with the 
objectively partisan-friendly media tone of their self-selected media. However, to a 
certain extent they do so, because they seem motivated to counteract the seemingly 
unfair or insufficient coverage about the EU.
Keywords
hostile media, media effects, EU elections, content analysis, survey research
Today’s media systems offer a greater choice of media than ever before, thereby 
shaping a political participation gap between news avoiders who seek media primar-
ily for social interaction and entertainment and news seekers with often strong parti-
san preferences who encounter a sufficient amount of political news to cast a vote 
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(Prior, 2013). Such a gap may well occur particularly in less newsworthy “second 
order” elections like the elections for the European Parliament (de Vries, van der 
Brug, van Egmond, & van der Eijk, 2011) on which this study focuses. People with 
strong partisan preferences may opt for selective exposure to like-minded media with 
a predictable partisan media content, which has been identified as a cause of political 
polarization in this new era in which autonomous effects of media content become 
impossible (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Stroud, 2010). The tendency to resort to 
“friendly, politically consonant media” has been addressed as the friendly media phe-
nomenon (FMP) by Goldman and Mutz (2011, p. 45). They find that self-selected 
media tend to lean in the direction of the respondent indeed: “the media environment 
experienced by most citizens is a friendly one.” The literature on the FMP (Goldman 
& Mutz, 2011) and on related phenomena like media-party parallelism and partisan 
selective exposure (Arceneaux, Johnson, & Murphy, 2012; Levendusky, 2013; 
Seymour-Ure, 1974; van Kempen, 2007) entails that particularly partisans selectively 
choose like-minded media. They may end up in echo chambers and filter bubbles, 
that confirm and reinforce their opinions (Dilliplane, 2014; Knobloch-Westerwick, 
2012; Knobloch-Westerwick, Johnson, & Westerwick, 2015; Stroud, 2010; 
Westerwick, Johnson, & Knobloch-Westerwick, 2017).
However, another strand of research shows a tendency of partisans to perceive 
news coverage on controversial issues as being biased against their own view, which 
has been addressed as the hostile media effect (HME; Gunther & Schmitt, 2004; 
Matthes, 2013; Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985); for reviews see Hansen and Kim 
(2011) and Perloff (2015). Vallone et al. (1985), who coined the concept of HME, 
found that both pro-Israeli and pro-Arab partisans disapproved media reports about 
the 1982 Beirut massacre. For partisans, the truth was either “black”—wholly mis-
aligned with their own views—or “white”—wholly aligned. Therefore, media 
reports were disapproved as being unfairly biased, although they presented a rather 
factual view on the massacre without choosing a side. The HME finds support both 
in experimental studies and in “out-of-lab” natural settings, for example, in large-
scale surveys (Eveland & Shah, 2003). Importantly, the HME has been shown to 
motivate corrective action among partisans (Barnidge & Rojas, 2014; Rojas, 2010), 
that is, attempts to make up for the presumed damage done by the seemingly unfair 
media coverage.
Is the HME compatible with the FMP? They seem to be compatible for politicians 
who use friendly media, including their own social media accounts, to attack hostile 
media and political adversaries alike. The more subtle question is, however, whether a 
voter who selected a partisan medium because of its partisan reputation would develop 
hostile media perceptions nevertheless. One answer to this question is that relatively 
hostile media perceptions in case of self-selected friendly media are simply “less rel-
evant because a relatively more hostile perception of favoritism on the part of a media 
source may, in reality, just be a relatively less friendly perception that is nonetheless 
still supportive of the reader or viewer’s political perspective” (Goldman & Mutz, 
2011, p. 44). A similar answer is that the FMP will drive out the HME in the long run, 
because hostile perceptions of neutral and adversary media content will motivate 
Kleinnijenhuis et al. 3
partisans to choose instead like-minded media that will be perceived as friendly media 
(see for the latter Feldman, 2011; Gunther, Edgerly, Akin, & Broesch, 2012).
The current study substantiates a third answer to the question whether the FMP and 
HME are compatible: they co-exist, with the HME strengthening the role of the FMP. 
To explore this possibility, a longitudinal research design is required to explain both 
the earlier choice of (friendly?) media, and in a later stage the (hostile?) perceptions of 
the provided media content. Therefore, the design includes a content analytic measure 
of the tone of various media and a survey measure of the perceptions thereof.
Compatibility of the FMP and HME
A general methodological reason why the FMP and HME may co-exist is that in FMP 
studies, partisan selective exposure is measured on the basis of objective indicators 
(e.g., the ideological leaning of a newspaper), whereas in most HME studies the mea-
sure for the tone of the media—alternatively labeled as their tenor, message tendency, 
sentiment or slant—is based on subjective perceptions (e.g., perceived media tone). 
Accordingly, these studies do not exclude that the FMP and the HME may co-exist. 
Self-selected friendly media might be objectively supportive of one’s position on the 
basis of content analysis data (proving the FMP), but nevertheless be subjectively per-
ceived by partisan respondents in surveys as relatively unsupportive or even hostile to 
their own position (supporting the HME).
Co-existence of the FMP and HME would still be unlikely in a fully predetermined 
world in which the choice of friendly media implies a guarantee in advance that each 
future news item will be friendly. Media choice is, however, not fully governed by the 
FMP, especially not for news avoiders, but also not for fanatic partisan news seekers 
who behave like media omnivores (Prior, 2013; Trilling & Schoenbach, 2015; Trilling, 
van Klingeren, & Tsfati, 2017). Media content is not fully governed by prior media 
choice either. Unexpected new issues with surprising or ambiguous issue positions of 
parties may come to dominate the news, also in self-selected media, like the EU-Ukraine 
relationship in the run-up to the European elections of 2014 (Kleinnijenhuis & van 
Atteveldt, 2016), on which this study concentrates. While the self-selection of media by 
partisans might be guided by predispositions that derive from traditional cleavage 
dimensions like the dominant socio-economic left-right dimension, so-called wedge 
issues do not align with these traditional cleavages (Kriesi et al., 2006; van de Wardt, 
De Vries, & Hobolt, 2014). In Europe, news about immigration, the European Union 
(EU), in short news about globalization, elicits a top-of-mind awareness of wedge 
issues. On the wedge issue of the EU—which is the topic here—opponents of the EU 
constitutional treaty in 2005 were scattered over the center (Christian Union), the left 
(Socialist Party), and the right (PVV) of the left-right dimension. Consequently, self-
selected and overall objectively friendly media with a centrist, leftist, or rightist leaning 
are unable to deliver uncontroversial news about the EU, thereby resulting in the HME.
The two intrinsic reasons why the FMP and HME might co-occur are the two mech-
anisms already observed by Vallone et al. (1985). They found two mechanisms at work 
(also see Perloff, 2015; Schmitt, Günther, & Liebhart, 2004). First, in their study, 
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partisans on both sides categorized a majority of the arguments included in the cover-
age as leaning against them. This mechanism, addressed in the literature as selective 
categorization, adheres to the principles of assimilation and contrast (Calvo, Chang, & 
Hellwig, 2014; Hovland, Harvey, & Sherif, 1957; Merrill, Grofman, & Adams, 2001), 
according to which stronger attitudes increase the range of arguments that are rejected 
as being in contrast to one’s position. The FMP and the HME may co-occur, because, 
in line with the attitude-based assimilation-contrast principle, people might be so 
deeply involved with an issue that their latitude of rejection becomes so wide that it 
even includes objectively friendly or even-handed news items. Particularly, people 
holding stronger attitudes might perceive objectively like-minded media as still insuf-
ficiently supportive of their own position. Second, in Vallone et al.’s study, partisans 
seemed to hold different standards about what selection of arguments they deemed 
accurate or representative of reality. This mechanism, addressed in the literature as the 
different standard explanation of the HME (Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, 1994; Schmitt 
et al., 2004), potentially results from partisans’ immersion in homogeneous environ-
ments or imagined communities (i.e., social networks, nations, self-selected media 
audiences, cf. Anderson, 2006; Gruzd, Wellman, & Takhteyev, 2011) that shape what 
they perceive as common facts or reality. Partisans are also prone to simply project and 
expect consensus, for example, by inferring that what they personally believe would 
also be shared by (relevant) others (Gunther & Christen, 2002). The FMP and HME 
might co-occur, because, in line with the different standards mechanism, the number 
or strength of arguments presented in objectively liked-minded media might be per-
ceived as an insufficient account of reality.
The FMP and HME might not only co-exist, they might also exert a joint influence 
on people’s political behavior, including voting behavior in a political election. The 
FMP implies that individuals willingly expose themselves to media with like-minded 
thoughts and ideas, which in turn reinforce their prior political predispositions and 
partisanship (Knobloch-Westerwick, 2012). For example, if pro-European people are 
regularly exposed to pro-European ideas in their self-selected media, their existing 
political inclinations should be reinforced, which makes them more likely to vote for 
a pro-European party. We propose, however, that the HME might, in parallel, further 
bolster this reinforcement effect of the FMP. This proposition runs against the inter-
pretation of the HME as a “defensive processing mode” that immunizes media users 
against media content (Gunther et al., 2012), thereby resulting in minimal media 
effects. Our argument builds on previous work that showed that the HME motivates 
corrective actions among users that perceive the media coverage as biased or hostile 
(Barnidge & Rojas, 2014; Rojas, 2010). Tsfati and Cohen (2005), for example, exam-
ined the effect of the HME in the context of the conflict between Gaza settlers and the 
Israeli government. They found that settlers’ self-selected media, which objectively 
were relatively even-handed toward the settlers’ point of view (Sheafer, 2005), were 
perceived nevertheless as biased and hostile. This HME, in turn, bolstered the personal 
opinions of settlers and indirectly even their legitimation to resort to violent protest. It 
might be argued that the HME mediated the relationship between the FMP, that is, 
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settlers’ exposure to like-minded media, and their legitimation to engage in protest. 
The subjective perception of settlers that even self-selected media that ought to sup-
port their own opinions seemed against them might have fuelled their moral obligation 
to assume their own right.
The Present Approach
In line with this thinking, in the present approach, we pursue the research question 
whether (a) the FMP and HME co-occur in the context of a political election and (b) 
jointly mediate the reinforcement of partisanship. We explore the general assumption 
that the HME might mediate the effect of the FMP, that is, the (friendly) tone of the 
news in self-selected media, on people’s voting behavior. To our knowledge, this idea 
has not been explicitly considered or examined before, presumably because most pre-
vious studies did not jointly measure both the content of self-selected media (to infer 
the FMP) and subjective perceptions of media content (to infer the HME).
An appropriate context to study the possible co-occurrence of the FMP and the 
HME is provided by elections for the European Parliament in the Netherlands. The 
Dutch media system provides a good context to study the FMP, because since the 
1870s, partisan selective exposure was institutionalized in the Netherlands through a 
high degree of party-media parallelism (or “pillarization”). Even radio and television 
were organized in line with popular support for political parties that were born out of 
social and religious cleavages. Although party-media relationships gradually dissolved 
in the Netherlands from the 1960s onward, the FMP is still present. Dutch citizens still 
put more trust in newspapers and television than in politicians, commercial enter-
prises, and labor unions (den Ridder, Boonstoppel, & Dekker, 2018). Trust in the news 
is higher than in most other European countries and much higher than in the United 
States (Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Nielsen, 2018).
However, since the topic of the EU is a wedge issue with supporters and critics of 
the EU anywhere on the political left-right spectrum, the pro- or con-EU tone of news 
stories in self-selected media may come as an unpleasant surprise that produces hostile 
media perceptions. This HME might, in turn, result in attitude-congruent corrective 
actions (Barnidge & Rojas, 2014; Rojas, 2010), thus in a vote for either a pro- or con-
EU party in elections for the European Parliament that is congruent with people’s 
attitudes and the objective content of their self-selected media. Therefore, the present 
approach pursues the core assumption that the FMP and HME co-exist, and that the 
HME mediates the effect of the FMP on election behavior.
More specifically, in the present approach, the FMP is predicted from partisan pre-
dispositions (H1ab, H2). An HME is predicted in spite of the FMP (H3, H4), and cor-
rective actions are predicted based on the HME (H5). Together, H1 to H5 build a 
conceptual causal model (Figure 1). The core hypotheses about the reinforcement of 
political preferences through the FMP and the HME (H6, H7) are hypotheses about 
causal paths that result from combining H1 to H5. The conceptual model also includes 
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The FMP. The FMP results from partisan selective exposure (Arceneaux et al., 2012; 
Goldman & Mutz, 2011; van Kempen, 2007). If given a choice, opinionated individu-
als will tend to gravitate toward objectively like-minded media content and avoid 
cross-cutting information (Knobloch-Westerwick et al., 2017; Stroud, 2010). In the 
context of EU elections, partisan selective exposure entails that selective exposure is 
guided by people’s vote at the previous EU election in favor of a pro- or con-EU party. 
In addition, people’s level of education should predict their choice of “highbrow” 
quality media versus “lowbrow” popular media, that is, of media that are used by news 
consumers with a similar level of education. Highbrow media tend to confirm the pro-
EU dispositions of the higher educated for whom the EU makes traveling and trading 
easy, while their jobs and salaries are not threatened by cheap labor from elsewhere in 
Europe (Bovens & Wille, 2010; Hakhverdian, van der Brug, & de Vries, 2012). In line 
with the idea of an FMP, we expect the following:
Hypothesis 1 (H1, FMP): A prior vote for a pro- rather than con-EU party (H1a), 
and a higher educational level (H1b) contribute to the choice of media with a pro-
EU rather than con-EU tone (H1ab, FMP).
Regular exposure to media supportive or critical of the EU shapes, in turn, people’s 
attitude toward the EU (Azrout, van Spanje, & de Vreese, 2012; Vliegenthart, Schuck, 
Boomgaarden, & de Vreese, 2008).
Hypothesis 2 (H2, attitudinal media effect): Exposure to media with a pro-EU 
rather than con-EU tone contributes to a pro-EU rather than a con-EU attitude.
H1 and H2 are not deterministic hypotheses. They do not exclude that the tone of the 
news toward the EU in self-selected media still differs from what was expected on the 
basis of predispositions. Attitudes toward the EU may still come to deviate from ear-
lier predispositions.
The mediating role of the HME. We expect that the FMP might breed attitudes that then 
“backfire,” with people forming stronger attitudes in favor or against the EU subjec-
tively perceiving the tone of “the media” (their self-selected media, but also other 
nonselected media) about the EU as relatively unsupportive of their own position. 
Hence, we expect,
Hypothesis 3 (H3, contrast-based HME): The more positive people’s attitude 
toward the EU, the more negative they perceive the media tone regarding the EU 
to be.
The HME might not only result from people’s personal attitudes, but also from 
what they perceive as standard or consensus, For example, within the readership of 
highbrow media or lowbrow news media, common perceptions may develop about the 
EU, and therefore, also common standards about what “the truth” is. For example, 
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people who are regularly exposed to a highbrow news medium that covers the EU in a 
favorable light may compare the tone of the news to standards of an “imagined com-
munity” of people who choose the same media that they selected themselves as their 
everyday comrade (Anderson, 2006; Gruzd et al., 2011). The more pro-European the 
news media people are exposed to, the more pro-European is probably also the social 
environment they are immersed in; accordingly, what they perceive as standard will be 
more pro-European. As HME research shows, higher standards, however, are more 
easily violated by coverage (particularly, if journalists aims to be fair and neutral), thus 
triggering perceptions of unfair coverage (Vallone et al., 1985). Accordingly, we 
expect,
Hypothesis 4 (H4, standard-based HME): The objective pro-EU or con-EU tone 
of self-selected news outlets contributes directly to a reversed “hostile” subjective 
perception of the tone of the media toward the EU.
Corrective action and reinforcement of partisanship. In line with prior research, the HME 
presumably triggers corrective action (Barnidge & Rojas, 2014; Rojas, 2010). In the 
present context, we, therefore, expect that the stronger the HME, the more people are 
inclined to correct for the seemingly insufficient or even unfair EU coverage by align-
ing their vote in the EU election even more firmly with their attitude toward the EU. 
More specifically, we expect the following:
Hypothesis 5 (H5, corrective action): The more people perceive the media to 
(unfairly) favor the EU, the more they will be inclined to vote for a contra-EU party 
and vice versa.
Conceptual model, indirect effects, and potential spurious relations. Figure 1 visualizes the 
numbers, labels, and interconnections of the separate hypotheses. The hypotheses 
about the expected effects of friendly media are depicted as solid blue arrows (H1, 
H2). The two hypotheses about hostile media perceptions (H3, H4) and the corrective 
action hypothesis (H5) give rise to three negative relationships. They are depicted as 
dashed red arrows.
The two core hypotheses of this article are, however, compound hypotheses about 
parallel combinations of serial paths. Figure 1 shows that positive serial paths are 
expected between predispositions and the tone of the media and the ultimate vote for 
a pro-EU or con-EU party, because the hostile media perceptions are expected to be 
reversed by corrective action (− − = +). H6 is about corrective action as a response to 
the perceived hostility of the tone of EU news in self-selected media. H6 is confirmed 
if the parallel combination of the serial paths H2→H3→H5 and H4→H5 is signifi-
cantly positive. H7 is about corrective action as a response to the perceived hostility of 
the tone of EU news in media that were partly selected on the basis of partisanship 
predispositions. H7 is confirmed if the parallel combination of the two serial paths 
H1→ H2→H3→H5 and H1→ H4→H5 is significantly positive.
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The model controls for more straightforward determinants of EU-attitudes and the 
vote for a pro-/con-EU party exist than the subtle serial paths underlying the core 
hypotheses (H6 and H7). For example, people’s choice for a pro- or con-EU party is 
influenced directly by the positive, Europhile or negative, Eurosceptic tone of EU 
news coverage (van Spanje & de Vreese, 2014) and, even more obviously, by 
EU-attitudes (Azrout et al., 2012; de Vries et al., 2011; Hobolt & Spoon, 2012). 
Furthermore, one might critically argue that the present core hypotheses deal with 
causal relationships, but that these relationships could be partly or completely spuri-
ous, since choices of media and parties, for example, may have common antecedents. 
In the case of the EU, such a spurious relationship will occur if the vote for a pro- or 
con-EU party at the previous EU elections and one’s educational level would not only 
result in the choice of like-minded media (as we expect in H1, FMP), but also directly 
in a corresponding EU-attitude shortly before the next EU elections and a correspond-
ing vote for a pro- or con-EU party at these elections. Such a direct effect would reflect 
the autonomous reinforcement of partisanship due to the relative stability of party 
identification (Dilliplane, 2014; Knobloch-Westerwick, 2012). To cope with these 
challenges, we controlled for several direct effects of antecedents, as can be seen from 
the gray arrows in the conceptual model. Taking into account these effects is a prereq-
uisite to demonstrate that the attitudinal media effect (H2) and the proposed mediated 
effects on the vote (H6 and H7) are not spurious effects after all.
Method
In general, a longitudinal research design with a “methodologically mature approach 
to temporal change” (Stanyer & Mihelj, 2016) is required to account for the long-term 
impact of selective exposure to friendly media at a previous point in time (Knobloch-
Westerwick, 2012). Accordingly, the current study was based on a content analysis of 
the tone of EU coverage in the media and on a long-term 2012-2014 panel survey of 
which three waves were used, the first wave from 2012, one wave immediately before, 
and one wave immediately after the 2014 European elections. Measures of factors that 
affect self-exposure to friendly media, that is, one’s position pro or con the EU and 
one’s level of education, were taken from a 2012 wave of the panel survey. The tone 
toward the EU of the media with the highest circulation was measured in the months 
preceding the 2014 elections. The self-selection of media in the previous months and 
their perceived media slant—here labeled as the perceived media tone—as well as the 
current attitude toward the EU were measured in the panel wave in the weekend before 
the 2014 EU elections. The vote at the 2014 EU elections was measured in the panel 
survey wave in the days immediately after the elections. A fast-forward look at Table 
1 gives an overview of the selected media.
Data
Panel survey data. The fieldwork to collect the panel survey data was commissioned to 
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one week before the EU elections on May 22, 2014. 1,160 voters also participated in 
the postelection survey immediately after the elections. Respondents in the pre-elec-
tion wave were all part of the first wave in the panel survey in July 2012, a few months 
prior to the 2012 parliamentary elections. Thus, first-time voters aged 18 years to 19.5 
years were excluded from the 2014 sample waves by design. The first wave of the 
sample in 2012 was a stratified sample of 1,804 citizens who were eligible to vote. The 
sample for the first wave was stratified according to the distribution of the votes 
between parties in the previous national elections of 2010, including the “party” of 
nonvoters. Furthermore, the sample was representative with respect to sociodemo-
graphic characteristics such as education and age. The sample was drawn from a pre-
registered census of about 100,000 people who were contacted by GfK to participate 
in survey research. Although panel attrition, 2 years later, was substantial (32% for the 
pre-election wave, 36% for the post-election wave), the 2014 sample is not signifi-
cantly different from the representative 2012 sample with regard to variables in the 
research model, like education and party choice.
Content analysis data. The content analysis included the news from December 1, 2013, 
until the elections on May 22, 2014 from five quality newspapers with a relatively 
large audience share among the higher educated, as well as two popular newspapers 
with lower educated readers and two free dailies with a relatively wide audience share 
of youngsters. Furthermore public television news was included. These media account 
for an audience share of 82% of the Dutch adult population. Table 1 gives an overview 
of metrics for these media.
The number of articles for the EU was determined with a search query for the EU 
and European actors, which delivered 5,770 news items. The term “Europe” and 
“European” were excluded from this query because they delivered too many false hits. 
Each of the investigated media, with the exception of the free daily Sp!ts, presented on 
average more than one news item per day about the EU. Quality newspapers and the 
popular newspaper De Telegraaf published on average more than five news items per 
day with references to the EU.
The data, search queries and scripts are accessible as DataVerse; https://hdl.handle.
net/10411/YDUA7T
Operationalization
Media tone (MT) of self-selected media. The tone of the news toward the EU was 
assessed with a measure for the contextual polarity of positive and negative associa-
tions with the EU at the sentence level that reckons not only with explicit evaluations, 
for example, in editorial comments, but also with the slant of hard news. The measure 
covers whether the EU is situated in a negative or positive context, regardless whether 
something is good or bad for the EU, whether the EU is acting well or badly from an 
ethical perspective, whether the EU is good or bad according to stakeholders, or 
whether EU performance is good or bad. An automated method of content analysis 
was chosen to allay the doubts in the core FMP-study of Goldman and Mutz (2011) 
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regarding whether human coders—many of whom presumably are highly educated 
and have a similar political ideology—might introduce their own biases into coding, 
although we are not aware of studies to substantiate such doubts. We could not use any 
of the standard tools for sentiment analysis at the level of news items, because articles 
about the EU usually deal with many other issues and actors as well. We applied an 
updated lexicon of positive and negative Dutch words that was originally derived from 
Brouwers’s thesaurus for Dutch words and phrases to each word that occurred within 
a distance of 20 words from the EU in a sentence about the EU—or about one of its 
institutions. Satisfactory reliability estimates were revealed by a comparison to human 
codings of sentences that were rated by the automated procedure as negative, positive, 
or nonevaluative F(EU-negative) = 0.78, F(EU-positive) = 0.83. The F-measure to 
assess the reliability of automated codings as compared to human codings by the 
authors is calculated as the harmonic mean of the number of correct hits from a sample 
of sentences about the EU that were machine-coded as positive (n = 200) or negative 
(n = 200), and the number of missed positive or negative hits about the EU in a sample 
of sentences that were machine-coded as neutral or irrelevant (n = 200). Reliability 
was not impaired unduly by the small minority of sentences with unusual designations 
of the EU, complex propositional reasoning, or with irony and sarcasm, which an 
automated procedure is unable to code.
The tone of the news in self-selected media was calculated as the subtraction of the 
square root of the number of negative words from the square root of the number of 
positive words within sentences about the EU, divided by the number of EU sentences 
in the media that was attended to by a specific respondent. The square root operation 
was applied to numbers of positive and negative EU sentences, because the square root 
turns out to be the optimal Box-Cox transformation to represent the idea of marginal 
increases of positivity or negativity when the number of positive or negative words 
increases (van Noije, Kleinnijenhuis, & Oegema, 2008). The measure was linearly 
transformed to the −1...+1 value range (−1 represented con-EU). Despite prior evi-
dence that respondents tend to overestimate their media use in self-report items 
(Scharkow & Bachl, 2017), a full 18% of the sample reported following none of the 
newspapers or TV stations in response to the battery of media exposure items in the 
current study (cf. Table 1, first column). The average tone of the news was assigned to 
respondents who were not exposed to one of the media that were investigated. Similar 
procedures to assign media content to respondents based on media choice were 
applied, for example, by van Spanje and de Vreese (2014); see Scharkow and Bachl 
(2017) for a methodological review.
EU attitude. Voters’ attitudes toward the EU were assessed by a single seven-point 
question
Are you all in all in favor of: abolition of the European Union, a much less strong 
European Union than now, a little less strong European Union than now, today’s European 
Union, a slightly stronger European Union than now, a much stronger European Union 
than now, or a European government for all member states.
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Respondents who did not know were recoded to a neutral position. The measure was 
linearly transformed to the −1...+1 range.
Perceived message tone. To measure the perceived tone of self-selected media, a 5-point 
scale was construed based on two questions. The first three-point question was “Was 
the news on the EU that you yourself paid attention to balanced, somewhat biased, or 
completely biased?” If the news was considered somewhat biased or completely 
biased, a follow-up question was asked to turn this three-point question into a 5-point 
polar scale: “Was the news on the EU that you yourself paid attention to biased in 
favor of, or biased against a stronger European Union?” The scale was transformed to 
the −1...+1 range (−1 representing strong anti-EU bias of own media). “Don’t know” 
answers were coded as neutral scores. To measure the perceived message tone of non-
selected media, a 5-point scale was construed from two similar questions, with the 
difference that the two questions were about the respondent’s impression of the news 
on the EU to which the respondent did not pay attention. The fairly strong correlation 
between the perceived tone of selected and not-selected media (0.47) indicates that in 
the case of the EU wedge issue, many voters perceive a common message tone of “the 
media” rather than a separate tone of self-selected media and nonselected media. 
Therefore, we opted to include the perceived message tone as a latent variable in the 
research model, with the tone of self-selected media and non-selected media as its 
indicators. If the two indicators would relate in unique ways to the other variables in 
the model, then a poor model fit would result, which would give rise to rejection of the 
model, and specifically of the unidimensionality of the perceived tone of “the media.”
Vote for a pro-EU party or con-EU party. The panel survey data, which measured party 
choice both in 2012 and 2014, in combination with expert survey data on the positions 
of these parties with regard to the EU in the 2009 and 2014 EU elections (Bakker et al., 
2015), allowed us to construe a behavioral pro- or con-EU variable with an interval 
level of measurement for respondents in the panel survey in 2012 and in 2014. To clas-
sify the Dutch parties on a 7-point pro-EU- versus con-EU scale, the judgments of 
experts in the Chapel Hill Expert Study with regard to overall positions of European 
parties on the EU in 2014 were used (Bakker et al., 2015). The same measure for 2009 
was used to scale the issue positions of political parties in the national elections that 
were held in 2012. The scores were linearly transformed to the −1...+1 value range 
(−1 representing entirely anti-European). This led to a continuum of parties with the 
antiimmigrant party PVV headed by Geert Wilders at the con-EU pole and D66 and 
GroenLinks at the pro-EU pole. Wilders opposed vehemently lending money to the 
almost bankrupt EU member state Greece, whereas D66 and GroenLinks vehemently 
opposed Wilders. EU positions were somewhat more polarized in 2014 than in 2009: 
the three parties that opposed the EU constitutional law in 2005 (CU/SGP, PVV, SP) 
took a more negative stance, whereas the pro-parties took a more positive stance. Not 
casting a vote—abstention from the ballot—was considered a mild form of withhold-
ing legitimacy to the EU, which was represented by a score of −0.33 on the 7-point 
−1...+1 scale.
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Data Analysis
The content analysis to arrive at a measure of bipolar sentiment scores was carried out 
with AMCAT, the Amsterdam Content Analysis Toolkit (https://github.com/amcat/; 
https://amcat.nl; van Atteveldt, 2008). Because the hypotheses involved several inter-
dependent endogenous variables, a structural equation model was estimated to test the 
hypotheses simultaneously. Maximum likelihood estimates of the regression parame-
ters and goodness-of-fit measures for the structural equation model were obtained 
using the R-package Lavaan, in which the Sobel-test is implemented to test hypothe-
ses about indirect effects (H6 and H7). We used robust Satorra-Bentler estimates of the 
standard errors of regression coefficients that apply also when the variables in the 
model do not show a multinormal distribution (Rosseel, 2012).
Results
Data Description
Table 1 provides, at the aggregate level of separate media, a description of the tone 
toward the EU for each medium and of audience metrics. Note that audience shares 
add up to more than 100% since audience share partly overlap each other.
A pro-EU tone prevails in quality newspapers. The popular newspaper De Telegraaf 
(−0.18), and TV news magazines (−0.12) relatively often portray the EU in a negative 
context, especially as compared to quality newspapers NRC Handelsblad (+0.41) and 
Trouw (+0.26).
Correspondingly, the attitude toward the EU is especially negative among the users 
of De Telegraaf (−0.21), RTL (−0.22), also among media avoiders (−0.23), and espe-
cially positive among readers of NRC Handelsblad (0.20). The pattern of average 
scores per audience reveals at a glance that education, and voting for a pro- or con-EU 
party appear to be positively correlated at the aggregate level with the average EU 
attitude and the media tone of self-selected media.
The contrasting signs of the perceived tone toward the EU of a medium in the audi-
ence of that medium as compared with other measures indicate that the perceived 
media tone runs both contrary to voting behavior, which is in line with the corrective 
action hypothesis, and contrary to the objective media tone of a medium and the EU 
attitude, which is in line with the HME. The perceived message tone in self-selected 
media and in nonselected media tend to have the same sign, which suggests that per-
ceived message tone is a one-dimensional concept.
In short, the descriptives at the aggregate level of media and from Table 1 are con-
sistent with expectations on the basis of the hypotheses on the level of individual 
media users. Table 2 provides the correlation coefficients, means, and standard devia-
tions at the level of individual panel survey respondents who also participated in the 
postelection wave (n = 1,160). The data from Table 2 suffice to reproduce the struc-
tural equation model below.
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Table 2 shows positive correlations throughout, but negative correlations with the 
perceived media tone of self-selected media and of other media. Thus, Table 2 is also 
consistent with expectations on the basis of the positive (solid) hypotheses versus the 
negative (dashed) hypotheses in the conceptual model of Figure 1.
The Structural Equation Model
To reveal the causal order that produced the correlations in Table 2, Figure 2 presents 
the results of the structural equation models that comprise the separate causal steps H1 
to H5 from the conceptual model in Figure 1, and also in gray, the effects that had to 
be controlled for. The figure’s legend includes goodness of fit statistics for the model 
and test statistics for the compound hypotheses (H6 and H7). A latent variable could 
be included in the model that taps both the perceived tone of self-selected media and 
not selected media. This indicates that the assumption that one latent dimension under-
lies both perceptions is a statistically valid assumption. From a communications point 
of view, this may mean that on the subject of the EU, the media are perceived as a 
monolithic attitude object, although different sides disagree about the tone of ‘the 
news in monolithic media.
The standardized parameter estimates in Figure 2 correspond to the hypotheses in 
Figure 1. They show that the expected causal relationships regarding the FMP (hypoth-
eses H1a, H1b, H2), the HME (H3, H4), and corrective action (H5) turn out to be 
significant in the expected direction. None of them is rejected. Note that if the depen-
dent variables would have been driven by media choice and not at all by media con-
tent, H2 and H4 would have been rejected. Figure 2 allows for a direct answer to the 
first part of the research question about whether the contrast-based and standards-
based mechanisms of the HME and the FMP co-occur in the context of a political 
election. They indeed co-occur, since not only the contrast-based HME (H3, −0.18) 
Table 2. Zero-Order Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations.
Pearson’s r 1 2 3 4 5 6 M SD
1 Education .5618 .2689
2 Vote pro- or con-EU party 2012 .225 −.0203 .4636
3 Media Tone pro- or con-EU (MT) .171 .120 −.0846 .2739
4 EU attitude .255 .300 .135 −.1316 .5385
5 Perceived MT self-selected media −.154 −.096 −.082 −.176 −.0086 .6863
6 Perceived MT nonselected media −.139 −.097 −.069 −.197 .470 −.0052 .6286
7 Vote pro- or con-EU party 2014 .273 .474 .137 .420 −.172 −.155 −.0052 .5672
Note. Based on n = 1,160 respondents who participated in the postelection survey. All variables are 
distributed in the polar value range, −1...+1, except for education, which has a positive value range 0.1. 
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and the standard-based HME (H4, −0.05) find support in the data, but also the FMP 
based on the prior vote (H1a, 0.09) and education (H1b, 0.15).
Significant estimates show up, although the direct effects of predispositions and of 
EU-attitudes on the vote for a pro-con EU party are generally stronger: 0.36 for the 
vote in previous elections, 0.11 for education, and 0.26 for the EU-attitude, respec-
tively. The direct effect of the media tone in self-selected media on the vote is insig-
nificant (+0.03, ns). Reestimating the model without this insignificant effect further 
improves the already solid fit of the model, χ2/df = 2.83 < 3, comparative fit index 
(CFI) = 0.99 > 0.9, root mean square error approximation (RMSEA) = 0.04 < 0.06, 
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = 0.025 < 0.05.
The second part of the research question on whether the FMP and the HME exert a 
joint influence on people’s political behavior can be answered with the test results for 
the compound hypotheses (H6 and H7; Figure 1, legend). Hostile perceptions of the 
tone of media toward the EU, which are reversed quite often in corrective actions to 
vote for a pro- or con-EU party, are themselves quite often the reverse of the pro- or 
con-EU tone of the news in self-selected media. This implies that corrective actions 
often reinforce the tone of the news toward the EU in self-selected media, as is indi-
cated by the z-test statistic for the Sobel tests in the legend of Figure 2 (H6 = 
H2→H3→H5 + H4→H5, p = .019).
Media with a specific tone toward the EU are selected in part on the basis of parti-
san predispositions, as indicated here by the vote for a pro-/con-EU party in the previ-
ous elections, and educational level. The Sobel test indicates that partisan 
predispositions are reinforced in part through the FMP, because they lead to the choice 
of media with a congruent pro- or con-EU tone, which in turn gives rise to an HME, 
which is compensated by corrective action (H7 = H1→H2→H3→H5 + H1→H4→H5, 
p = .032). Thus, the answer to second part of the research question is that the FMP and 
HME exert a joint influence in reinforcing partisanship indeed.
These research results confirm earlier research findings that self-selected media 
reinforce partisanship, that is, the relation between the previous vote and the current 
vote for either a pro- or con-EU party, through the FMP (Dilliplane, 2014; Knobloch-
Westerwick, 2012). However, the current study shows that, in addition, this mediating 
partisan selective exposure effect or friendly media effect (H1ab) is, itself, mediated 
by corrective actions to standards-based (H4→H5) or contrast-based (H2→H3→H5) 
hostile media perceptions. Thus, the full answer to the research question is that the 
HME and the FMP do not only co-occur but also that the HME mediates the mediating 
effect of the FMP on the reinforcement of partisanship.
Discussion
Studies on the HME show that media users perceive media coverage as biased (Hansen 
& Kim, 2011; Perloff, 2015; Vallone et al., 1985). However, other research shows that 
partisans selectively turn to like-minded media, resulting in a FMP (Arceneaux et al., 
2012; Goldman & Mutz, 2011; Levendusky, 2013; van Kempen, 2007). Political 
polarization may result once highly involved citizens opt for partisan media, or even 
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for exposure to partisan echo chambers and filter bubbles (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; 
Stroud, 2010). The HME and the FMP seem to be at odds at first sight. In the case of 
objectively friendly media, perceived media hostility appears to be either irrelevant or 
merely a motivation to choose even more friendly media. Based on methodological 
and theoretical arguments to the contrary, the research question is addressed whether 
nevertheless the FMP and HME might co-occur and even strengthen each other in 
reinforcing partisan predispositions.
To control for the self-selection of media, a longitudinal research design over a 
2-year period with four measurements was used to measure successively partisan pre-
dispositions in a first wave of a panel survey in 2012, media content in self-selected 
media in the months before the next EU elections, hostile media perceptions in a panel 
survey wave shortly before the elections, and the vote for a pro- or con-EU party in the 
final panel survey wave immediately after the next elections for the European 
Parliament in the Netherlands in May, 2014. The EU can be considered as a wedge 
issue on which issue positions are not structured along the dominant left-right axis 
(van de Wardt et al., 2014). Therefore, it is unlikely that voters will have selected like-
minded media solely on the basis of EU-specific predispositions. This in turn makes it 
likely that they will have encountered relatively often unexpected media content about 
the EU that was perceived as hostile.
In the case of the EU, voters considered indeed “the media” as hostile, thus not only 
the media that they did not attend to, but also their self-selected media. Although trust 
in the media and the news are high in the Netherlands (den Ridder et al., 2018, 
pp. 15-16; Newman et al., 2018, pp.16-17), on the issue of the EU they were perceived 
as hostile, both as compared to personal EU attitudes (Calvo et al., 2014; Hovland 
et al., 1957; contrast-based HME) and as compared to the presumed standards of an 
“imagined community” of like-minded people that choose the same media (Anderson, 
2006; Gruzd et al., 2011; standards-based HME). An answer to the research question 
requires an assessment of the direction and the strength of indirect causal effects of 
HMEs in response to media that were partly chosen on the basis of partisan predisposi-
tions on corrective action in the vote for a pro- or con-EU party. Sobel-tests were used 
to assess the significance of these indirect causal effects in a structural equation model 
that reckons also with direct effects and spurious effects of EU-related predispositions, 
news, and attitudes. The examination of these hypothesized indirect causal relation-
ships revealed that voters opted for like-minded media, but nevertheless perceived 
these media as hostile, which in turn increased the likelihood to vote precisely in line 
with previous attitudes and, paradoxically, also in line with the actual tone of self-
selected friendly media that was subjectively perceived as hostile. These novel insights 
provide an answer to the research question. The HME and the FMP do co-occur, and 
moreover strengthen each other. Hostile media perceptions of friendly media  do rein-
force partisanship—an effect already hinted at by the findings of a study by Tsfati and 
Cohen (2005). The parameter estimates in Figure 2 show the significance of this rein-
forcement effect, in addition to many other effects on partisanship, other media effects, 
and other paths to reinforce partisanship.
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What are the wider implications of this finding? The present study rejects the idea 
that the HME or the FMP would result in minimal media effects in the digital era. The 
HME may result in a defensive mood against media content  (Günther et al., 2012), but 
this perceived hostility is the basis for corrective action. The FMP, that is, the choice 
of relatively friendly media, predetermines the tone of actual media content to a cer-
tain degree (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008), but news content in self-selected media is suf-
ficiently independent from prior media choice to make it worthwhile for campaigners 
to launch newsworthy news events that reach undecided and hostile voters. The effects 
of EU news on the vote in the next EU elections in combination with the modest expla-
nation of the choice of media by EU-relevant predispositions, points out that media 
choice is only half of the story to explain the tone of the news in self-selected media. 
The structural equation model shows that the effects of the subtle causal chains run-
ning from the FMP to corrective actions based on the HME are relatively modest, both 
as compared to other ways in which partisan selective exposure may reinforce parti-
sanship, and as compared to other ways in which changes in the tone of the media may 
influence the vote (Dilliplane, 2014; Knobloch-Westerwick, 2012). In short, the 
research results do not at all exclude that future campaigners and future media will 
find a variety of ways to exert not-so-minimal effects on citizens.
An obvious limitation of the current longitudinal study is its application to one 
wedge issue, the EU, in one multimedia-multiparty system, the Netherlands. We 
expect that the results will also hold for other wedge issues on the globalization dimen-
sion of politics (Kriesi et al., 2006). For issues on the socioeconomic left-right dimen-
sion that determine the choice of like-minded media more strongly, we do not expect 
a strong HME or corrective action in reaction. We are not aware of a priori arguments 
why the result that the HME may strengthen the effect of the FMP would be highly 
system dependent, but additional research is required. Does the result also apply in 
two-party systems with higher levels of bipartisan polarization, in systems with a 
much higher percentage of news avoiders who don’t cast a vote, in systems with a 
more narrow or an even more wide range of media choice than the Netherlands, or in 
systems without a high level of trust in the media and in the news in general that may 
compensate for the feelings of hostility toward the tone of the news about wedge 
issues? Future studies could measure the tone of the news in self-selected media in 
other ways, or differentiate between the tones within various news frames.
The research findings appear to provide a rationale for media bashing by political 
candidates, because convincing latent voters that their self-selected media are hostile 
against them could direct these voters to friendly media in their favor. New research is 
required to understand whether political propaganda may foster the FMP and the HME 
indeed, and next, whether a strong HME in turn contributes indeed to the FMP, thus to 
the choice of friendly partisan media, rather than to media omnivorism or to media 
avoidance.
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